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Abstract 
Scholars have charged Adorno of hypocritically abandoning 
efforts to articulate possibilities of social transformation, a 
propensity he emphasizes is central to social critique and 
sociocritical sociology. Keeping consistent with his 
fundamentally negative position, this essay reexamines 
democracy by scoping his work and reorganizing its 
philosophical and sociological contexts to open dialogue on the 
characteristics of democracy that Adorno would not reject. 
Throughout, I negatively reflect upon the nature of this 
democracy and criticize it towards the goal of fleshing out the 
paths of social transformation possible and available for its 
realization – through the things it could not be. Adopting this 
coupling as a point of departure, I analyze the regression of 
consciousness in Adorno’s thought, as the root of ego-
weakness – the destroyer of maturity and that which underpins 
every shackle he sees as subjugating the masses – and bring 
this into dialogue with the insights informed by Hannah Arendt, 
Leo Strauss, and action theory. To examine the practical 
implications of social transformation, this essay will also 
demonstrate how they play out in contemporary contexts, 
drawing parallels with evidence from contemporary social 
movements, on account of their conception as a means of social 
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transformation and of Adorno’s own engagement with this 
conception. 
Introduction 
Kracauer once said to Adorno “you curse [bourgeois society], 
reject Communism, from down on… Social Democracy… what do 
you suggest be done?” (Adorno and Kracauer 2008:517), to which 
the latter replied: “I know and say, what is bad; is this not enough?” 
(ibid). The charge that Kracauer’s critique represents is a serious 
one: that Adorno hypocritically abandons efforts to articulate 
possibilities of social transformation, a propensity he emphasizes is 
central to social critique and sociocritical sociology (Adorno, 
Horkheimer et al [1953] 1989:151), for the purpose of “[countering] 
capitulation on the part of those who alone can bring about change” 
(Benzer 2011:125). One leaves Adorno’s work with a view of him 
not inconsistent with Kracauer’s position; Adorno’s punishing 
indictments of the astral body and the foolery circulating in its veins 
(Adorno 1994:177), ensconced in an overarching assault on 
exchange society, seemingly makes us bear prescient awareness of 
how the most probable futures converge on a petrified landscape not 
different than the one we occupy.  
Scholars since Adorno have failed to properly account for his 
fundamental negative position in issues of methodology (Jung 2013; 
Keller and Poferl 2016; O’Neill 2008), and effectively prescribed for 
Adornoian thought a form of identity thinking he himself spited, 
ignoring the non-identity thinking or “consciousness of non-
identity” (Adorno 2001:17). They have, for instance, imagined him 
as a champion for a staunchly qualitative program of research and 
indiscriminately opposed to quantitative approaches (Jung 2013) – a 
result of emphasizing his observations on how seemingly 
“individual” cases or data had “general value” in a “refined, 
discriminating” approach that produced an “abundance of specific, 
concrete insights” (Adorno 2000:74), whilst, by abandoning his 
negative position, ignoring how it was the standards of form within 
quantitative research that he spited, not the methods themselves (Au 
N.d., 2018).
Adorno stood firm in his negative position of rejecting
possibilities, more than accepting them, for the reason that the latter 
would necessarily foreclose potential avenues and ways of thought 
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– a mind satisfied with an answer, no longer thinking – otherwise
available to the former – a mind perpetually dissatisfied, so
perpetually searching and thinking. Thus, the misstep in reading
Adorno often arises when we desert this negative position and
misinterpret Adorno’s critiques for his vision for the future;
interpreting, superficially, that his choice to write about what is bad
is all that his thought (and the possible futures of a reproduced
society dependent on us) consists of, bereft of any idea of good,
wherein his books lament our present conditions while nevertheless
leaving us bolted in place.
The evidence presented in this article argues that this is not the 
case: that Adorno does have a specific vision of what social 
transformation looks like for society, and that the roadmap to 
attaining it can even come from relying on that which he rejects, 
albeit for a temporary period of time: heteronomy.  
Cook’s reading of Adorno offers an insightful glimpse of 
Adorno’s vision of social transformation, whereby certain 
“‘emphatic’ concepts, e.g. ‘freedom’ or ‘justice’… faithfully convey 
what a better society would look like, i.e. unfulfilled normative 
standards of what society should be” (Benzer 2011:135; Cook 2001, 
2005). Moreover, in a deliberation with Becker on the ideals of 
German education and the workforce, Adorno proffers an elusive 
endorsement of representative democracy when he engages with 
Kant:  
‘Enlightenment is humanity’s emergence from self-
incurred tutelage.’ I believe this forthright program 
of Kant’s is extraordinarily relevant today. 
Democracy, embodied in the institution of 
representative elections, depends on the moral 
development of each individual (Adorno and 
Becker 1983). 
Implicated is the necessity to unearth the normative standards of 
society’s ideal form within his appreciation of democracy – a theme 
crucial to Adorno’s work, but buried in references, rather than 
explicit treatments, and which produce rejections of its possibilities, 
rarely yielding any endorsements.  
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I do not attempt, on this score, to delineate a positive object 
(democracy) as the obverse of negative criticism from his thought, 
but simply aim to flesh out his views on the subject, particularly in 
the context of his favor for social transformation (Benzer 2011:149) 
and a world at risk that grows more and more in need of it (Beck 
2010). Keeping consistent with his fundamentally negative position, 
this essay reexamines democracy by scoping his work and 
reorganizing its philosophical and sociological contexts to open 
dialogue on a vision of democracy and its characteristics that Adorno 
would not reject. Throughout, I negatively reflect upon the nature of 
this democracy and criticize it towards the goal of fleshing out the 
paths of social transformation possible and available for its 
realization – through the things it could not be.  
Adopting this coupling as a point of departure, I analyze the 
regression of consciousness in Adorno’s thought that sheds new 
light on these ideals, and engage it with insights informed by Hannah 
Arendt, Leo Strauss, and action theory. In particular, I focus on the 
regression of consciousness, amongst the many things Adorno 
criticizes, as the root of ego-weakness – the destroyer of maturity 
and that which underpins every shackle Adorno (1994) sees as 
subjugating the masses, from mass culture production (10), to 
astrology (59), to common discourses organizing social life (89). To 
examine the practical implications of social transformation, this 
essay will also demonstrate how they play out in contemporary 
contexts, drawing parallels with evidence from contemporary social 
movements. Social movements serve as an ideal empirical backdrop 
with which to begin these assessments, on account of their 
conception as a means of social transformation (Benzer 2011:149-
150) and of Adorno’s own engagement with this conception.
The Regression of Consciousness 
Permanence 
Democracy, for Adorno, was interrupted largely by what he 
deemed a regression in the human ability to think. For him, the 
prevalence of occultism or astrology at the time was the surge of 
nothing more than “a metaphysic of dunces” (Adorno 1994:175), but 
which was the greatest “symptom of the regression in 
consciousness”, in which “[it] has lost the power to think the 
unconditional and to endure the conditional” (ibid:172). That is, 
Towards Social Transformation 
57 
when we submit to the will of the gods, rather than see society – and 
its problems – as a network of mediated interactions that we 
constitute, we sit on our hands and abandon attempts to change our 
reality. This is not the submission of structure to the overwhelming 
role of agency, but the recognition of our role in replicating 
structure: as Adorno once countered to Sartre’s political 
existentialism that insisted on the perpetual capacity to choose one’s 
own actions (Sartre 1973:43), “social relations and conditions… 
[are] a timely addition… [but] structurally hardly more than 
occasions for action” (Adorno 2001:59-60). 
The reference to a regression of consciousness gains further 
clarity when understood in the context of his comments on the ego 
and (Kantian) maturity, the latter of which he heavily invests his 
ideal for individual autonomy:  
…maturity requires a certain degree of ego 
firmness, as it emerges in the case of the bourgeois 
individual. The possibility… that instead of 
developing a firm ego, one allows it to adjust to 
ever-changing situations, harmonizes in a very 
problematic way with the psychological 
phenomenon of ego weaknesses (Adorno and 
Becker 1983).  
An alternate reading of “the regression of consciousness”, then, 
draws parallels with an ego weakness or, put bluntly, intellectual 
ineptitude. He essentially reaffirms in the same breath that dual 
propensities for adaptation and individuality fail to counteract ego 
weakness for the fact that all their pseudo-intellectual efforts and 
struggles are only prompted by and predicated on the “configuration 
of rigid obedience and lack of true introjection of norms” (Adorno 
1994:107). But Adorno’s examination of the socialization process in 
early childhood in his discussion of psychological autonomy 
confronts us with an ominous characteristic of the regression of 
consciousness. Here he references the results of empirical studies in 
America that demonstrate what might now be called the longitudinal 
effects of the social conditions of upbringing, where “so-called well-
behaved children tend to become autonomous and critical men and 
women more so than refractory children, who then as adults 
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immediately gather 'round the beer table with their teachers to rally 
'round the same slogans” (Adorno and Becker 1983). In other words, 
the possibilities of changing an ego are foreclosed beyond 
socialization in childhood. Searching for a remedy in education, he 
also expresses, “remains too much embedded in the institution of the 
framework of the school” (109). It is for this reason that recourse to 
other extant institutions, which cannot escape the logics – profit, 
exchange – of capitalist society, such as film (109-110), religion 
(Zeitlin 2001:225-227), etc. which produce efforts that necessarily 
fail. It follows, therefore, that the regression of consciousness is a 
permanent state.  
Universality 
In addition to the institutionalization of superstition that enables 
its mass production (Adorno 1994:50), we can identify within 
Adorno’s (1994) indictment of occultism and mass culture, as both 
symptoms and vehicles of the regression of consciousness, the 
themes of dependence, estrangement, and integration – themes that 
run through the rest of his work and which are responsible for 
proliferating the exchange principle, holding us captive within the 
petrified conditions of a capitalist present (153–66). They act as 
instruments of dependence – subjugating man’s freedom by 
exploiting him under the illusion of necessity and through dominion 
over the relations of production – by selling illusions as a means for 
distraction from the threat of dreariness (176) and uniting the subject 
with society’s exploitative productivist imperative through a bi-
phasic approach. Deceivingly deemed a work-life balance, the 
separation of work from play is a cultural lifestyle axiom bound up 
in contradictory narratives that serve to exploit individuals: work is 
severed from play, but play is imbued with a sense of duty (pleasure 
being a “release” from the pressures of labor) – we are thus made to 
accept the exploitative conditions of work by the solace of play, 
ensnared in society’s productivist apparatus like Huxley’s Brave 
New World (102–3). At the same time, they facilitate estrangement 
– the objectification of society, wherein its relations and phenomena
appear external and alien to us, rather than socially mediated – by
attributing everyday occurrences to the movement of the stars and
phenomena beyond our control in an unrecognizable, external
society and robbing individuals of all agency but the minimum
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needed to conform (ibid.). Combined, they imply social integration 
or the proliferation of the exchange principle in capitalist society that 
makes everything commensurable in a world of objects (173), from 
which we learn that the regression of consciousness is, more or less, 
universal. By manifesting the “universal principle of [commodity] 
exchange” (Adorno 2008:95), they further infringe upon the tenets 
of the human condition by attacking the possibilities of human 
action, political freedom, and unique personality (Arendt 1968:146) 
in a way that threatens the communion of man (politics1 (Arendt 
1973:437-459)) and renders commensurable and subject to 
exchange, people, who are no longer free. In this way, the regression 
of consciousness comes to burrow itself in altered political and 
social conditions that facilitate its encroachment upon more of 
society.  
Unsettling the Regression 
Social Transformation 
In seeking a solution to the problem of unsettling the permanent, 
universal regression of consciousness buried in the exchange 
principle and its manifestations, Adorno’s pressing calls for social 
transformation, coupled with his propositions against “piecemeal 
social engineering” (Popper 1944:122) or small transformations 
within the capitalist system (Benzer 2011:149), may lead us to the 
vision of a revolution.2 This possibility, and the violence 
inextricably bound up within its implications, however, would be 
vehemently rejected by Adorno. In his denunciation of violent praxis 
(ibid:149-150), Adorno “disobeys the eternal cycle of… violence 
1 For Arendt, politics was cooperation, not competition; not rigidly defined by 
the function of repression or individual gain, but bound up in freedom, as a 
precursor to participation and common action (Cooper 1976; see also Sennett 
2012). 
2 Popper and Adorno part ways here for their visions of utopia and the role of 
critical theory. Popper believes that critical thinking is an invariable part of 
human rationality, and that utopianism, which would destroy this capacity, is 
something to resist. Popper enlists critical theory as a principal mechanism. 
Adorno, by contrast, believes that utopia itself is the result of a successful social 
transformation. Here, Adorno considers critical theory not only as unproductive, 
effecting changes in the way we think on such a small scale that could never 
amount to social transformation (piecemeal social engineering), but also as an 
actual obstacle towards the goal of transformation for its abidance by traditions 
that reject social transformation (Szrot 2014). 
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against violence… [he] refuses [his] allegiance to anyone who, after 
the murder of uncounted millions of humans… still preaches 
violence” (Adorno 2002:17-18). His antagonism of “violence 
against violence” as a state of society recalls an analogous critique 
made by contract theorists of the state of each against all. 
Juxtaposing the lessons from their struggle with Adorno’s position 
against heteronomy alerts us to: 
i. the violence implicated in a state of a society without
authority;
ii. the indispensability of authority to resisting this state,
and, most importantly:
iii. that Adorno’s calls for individual autonomy cannot
suffer conflation with a rejection of authority altogether.
It is authority’s heteronomous form, where “no one in 
contemporary society can really lead a life that is self-determined” 
(Adorno and Becker 1983), and only this form that Adorno takes 
issue with. For a society that has adopted such a heteronomous form 
of authority becomes intractable for subjective logical thought 
(Benzer 2011:189); it realizes Durkheim’s society that confronts us 
as a body of alien objects and phenomena, one where we are 
subjects, more than agents (Adorno et al 1976:12).  
Social Transformation 
Where, then, if not in education, in revolution, or in small 
activist projects, can we discover the means to uproot the exchange 
principle, and through it, establish representative democracy? In 
what forms could critical social theory as “the only viable – and… 
indispensable – project” (Benzer 2011:147) be actionized? What 
about protests? The only available efforts remaining inspire recourse 
to popular movements or to the introduction of enlightened elites. 
The former, however, dwells dangerously close to a naïve form of 
activism that adheres to “a pseudo-reality” (Adorno 1998:291) by 
treating “opponents in discussions as mere instruments for executing 
their plans, as things” (Benzer 2011:146) or prioritizing the means 
over the ends. Recent popular mobilizations corroborate an 
extremized account of this inversion.  
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The Global Climate March in November 2015 joins the 
American Occupy movement (Smucker 2014) and the Hong Kong 
Umbrella Revolution in demonstrating a tendency toward 
prefigurative politics, wherein self-expression suffers conflation 
with content, actions become prefigurations of an actor’s vision, and 
“acts are celebrated for their own sakes” (Gramsci 1991:147). The 
space itself saw about the representation of a farrago of different, 
incoherent, issues in signs, costumes, and chants, including: saving 
the bees, eating vegan, saving the dolphins, starting clean energy, 
stopping fracking, ending fossil fuel dependence, promoting 
“systemic change” (left undefined), criticizing Secretary of State for 
Energy and Climate Change Amber Rudd. When asked about this 
diversity, a female protester, holding a sign saying “stop bombing 
Syria” by the Socialist Worker newspaper booth, told me  
[The protest] just a place for you to voice your 
opinion. The climate is just a word. It’s about 
crimes against humanity, it’s about solidarity and 
all coming together to make a message… 
Another male protester notes, 
[The main message is] essentially fossil fuel and 
energy change, though there’s a lot of stuff going on 
too… Well bombing Syria was yesterday, and the 
veganism is really with us, but it’s all about people 
getting together and demonstrating solidarity and 
making our voices heard… 
Me: Do you feel the diversity of the message was a 
problem? 
Him: No, it’s all about getting the government 
to listen to the people (Au 2017a). 
The prefigurative tendencies of this protest are not isolated. In a case 
study of protests stratified across differing themes – foreign affairs, 
anti-discrimination, peace, policy critiques –, the same tendencies 
were identifiable. Whether the protest made the immediate structural 
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changes it demonstrated against became secondary to the act 
of protesting itself. At the end of the protest against the 
British Parliamentary vote for the bombing of Syria in 
December 2015, I asked whether the protest “had done 
anything” to different actors scattered across the site, to which 
they responded: 
A Marxism-pamphlet distributor: No, this won’t do 
anything… need an anti-imperial movement, but we 
need numbers. It’s about momentum, and it’s 
important we meet each time to bring more 
people… People don’t join because of pessimism. 
Officer: The short answer is no it hasn’t, but it does 
matter that they’re here… It matters for them. 
Young European: Whether it has an effect or not 
doesn’t matter, it is just done to warm people’s 
hearts, whether it’s one thousand or one [shrugs] 
just to warm hearts. 
Older female: It’s a way to express ourselves and 
know that I’m not alone.” (ibid) 
Different actors – even the police, when sympathizing with the 
protest – consistently referred to the theme of prefiguration. But 
whilst prefiguration may insulate protesters from the 
discouragement that failures might create toward present and future 
mobilization, it ultimately falls upon a Gramscian-utopian narrative 
that fails to remain sufficiently informed about what it takes for 
social change to occur – their primary failure, according to Adorno, 
lies in the maintenance of the status quo, dangerously repackaged as 
a success in some way. The socialized society thus continues to 
regulate all living activity, “prescrib[ing] and limit[ing] the 
conditions of any individual’s action” (Adorno 1998:264). Adorno’s 
admonition of naïve activism anticipates the distortion witnessed in 
the aims of contemporary popular mobilizations, where the means 
are not simply prioritized over the ends, but the ends have been 
entirely dissociated from implementing consequential change – the 
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tendency to replicate the status quo, though left unchanged, has now 
brazenly surfaced.  
Implications for Action Research 
How do these limits relate to existing accounts of action 
research? Making sense of action coordination in groups, 
anticipatory socialization and action theories have contributed by 
deconstructing the negotiations invested in them. Seminal work by 
Alfred Schutz (1967) and Pierre Bourdieu (1973, 2000) towards this 
effort have produced important mediations between phenomenology 
and Weberian rational action, illuminating the conditions that 
predict the degree to which actors’ protentions – orientations 
towards the future – and projects – rationally designed plans and 
aspirations – align to drive action. But where these theoretical 
approaches have failed to account for non-rationally motivated 
action, new action theories have underscored the intrapersonal 
negotiations of future-coordinating within the immediate moment of 
interaction itself, as pertinent to the interpersonal coordination of 
action (Tavory and Eliasoph 2013); whereas Schutz and Bourdieu 
have overemphasized socialized individuals’ encounters with an 
external world, new action theorists have essentially emphasized 
socialized individuals’ encounter with themselves (Au N.d.).  
According to Tavory and Eliasoph, modes of future-
coordination “merge, detach, and interlace in everyday interaction… 
when actors place similar protentions on different narratives, when 
actors place similar trajectories on different temporal landscapes, or 
when actors ambivalently orient themselves to multiple futures at 
once” (2013:909). Thus, the distinction between effectual praxis and 
ineffectual praxis is captured in the interlacing of such protentions. 
Ineffectual praxis speaks to a scheme of fragmented naturalized 
plans – the bedrocks of sedimented values and expectations on 
which other future-oriented trajectories are performed (Thévenot 
2006). Where this normally occurs among actors, the coordination 
of their protentions can keep an interaction going, albeit with “repair 
work” to ignore tensions between differing views (Eliasoph 2011). 
However, ineffectual praxis in protests as an apparent vehicle for 
social transformation lack this repair work, wherein a diversity of 
opinions goes without attempt to coordinate or reconcile any of them 
– that there are none of the usual tensions that normally exist
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between differing views in such a context speaks to how there is no 
imperative to cooperate in the first place, even within the same 
temporal landscape.  
Orchestrating the Condition for Transformation 
The Agents of Change 
From Adorno’s critiques of education, occultism, and activism, 
the constitution of “the people” he perceives can be distinguished 
into three constituencies of actors that throw into sharp relief an 
irreconcilable distrust of these constituencies, underlain by a 
defeatism that diverts our search for a solution elsewhere. Mediocre 
mediums and their mediocre audience who accept “the excuse that 
the world of spirits can convey no more to poor human reason than 
the latter can take in” (Adorno 1994:95,176) constitute the many, for 
whom the project of social critique is obviously impossible. Then 
there are some who are, at best, disillusioned with the status quo, but 
fail to appreciate the reach of integration, which “encroaches on life 
intensely enough to render free decision illusory” (Adorno 1996:59-
60 as cited in Benzer 2011:146); privy to the knowledge that the 
world needs to be changed, yet they “behave as if one could change 
the world tomorrow” (Adorno et al. 1976:129). And finally, there 
are the few who both exhibit maturity or “ego firmness”, but whom 
are often located in the bourgeois individual (Adorno and Becker 
1983), and are capable of visualizing the expanse of integration to 
the effect of actionizing a socio-critical awareness that escapes 
situation-bound acting (Adorno 1998:264-6, 291), but would remain 
too few in number to organize anything beyond piecemeal activity.  
The Politics of Change and the Human Condition 
The dislocation of the potential for social transformation from 
(all constituencies of) “the people” prompts two interrelated lines of 
inquiry in our continued search for an escape from an exchange 
society and its manifestations: the validity of an electoral 
democracy, and the potentialities and implications bound up in the 
use of elites or heteronomous authority as a means. If the people 
cannot be trusted, then what good is an electoral democracy? Now 
presented with the case of a dependent, fragmented, and powerless 
people subservient to even tarot-wielding agents of the exchange 
principle, the transformation that Adorno urges in contemporary 
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capitalist society is compatible with the creation and utilization of 
elites. That is, rule should be assumed by political figures consisted 
of the few ego firm and autonomous thinkers capable of socio-
critical awareness; their empowerment would involve support from 
the remaining constituencies of the people, who comprise the 
majority of society, thus capitalizing on their identification of the 
ailments of capitalist society and their desire to resist against 
ideology following its demystification (Adorno 1998:69), but 
without taxing their ineptitude for social critique.  
This builds on the proposition that different social conditions 
require different types of rule in any given society (Zeitlin 1997:68-
70). The case of Rome illustrates this principle and the lessons to be 
gained from it, grounded on striking convergences with 
contemporary capitalist society: members of society had lost their 
strong populace integrity by the very conditions that deprived them 
of authority slackened their sense of autonomy and drove them to 
depend on authority (ibid); where the deprivation of leadership by 
oppression under nobles and tyrants had kept the (majority plebeian) 
Romans servile to Caesar, and thus incapable of restoring their 
republic, a similar deprivation of autonomy itself has rendered a 
large proportion of contemporary capitalist society incapable of 
forming a true electoral democracy, still dependent on authority. 
Sensitizing ourselves to the congruence between forms of rule and 
social conditions, we gain insight into the possibility of using an 
alternate form of rule, more appropriate to current conditions of 
society, as a means by which (the conditions for) electoral 
democracy can be obtained. 
Indeed, though Caesar became a tyrant, he nevertheless 
emancipated the people from the existing system of domination, and 
his popular ascension the very proof of a seized opportunity to inject 
public interests into the political consciousness of the ruling system. 
Similarly, the assumption of power by socio-critical thinkers must 
be succeeded by commitments to remodel the relations of production 
in ways that expunge heteronomous authority and the exchange 
principle, and which enable and encourage autonomy, across all of 
its systems (film, etc.). The achievement of a free-thinking public 
must precede the relinquishment of power among the former 
autonomous leaders – to dismantle, by then, the last vestige of 
heteronomous authority – whose successors would then be 
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representatives elected from among the public. Indeed, if 
dependence to authority is currently irremediable and occupies a 
locus within modern capitalist society of universal scope, then the 
greatest hope for its demise is found in itself, made into a means to 
engineer this reality; its prominence in the future can only be 
overturned by a temporary adherence to authority in the present – to 
rely upon heteronomous authority, after which the conditions of 
autonomy can be established in the political system and ego-
firmness3 disseminated widely across society.  
Relying on elites a lá Caesar to lead us towards realizing this 
vision of a free-thinking, autonomous public, as Adorno also 
recognized, has its dangers. Attempts by heteronomous orders to 
control an environment would suffer from the same drawbacks as 
identity-thinking – they themselves would have to be overturned by 
the object of their authority. But what an ego-firm authority 
proposition sets up, consistent with this observation, is a trajectory 
towards such an overturning succeeded by conditions of a free-
thinking public. Reliance on ego-firm elites is only temporary until 
they obtain power and encourage autonomy across all systems, after 
which they are meant to be over-turned. On another note, one does 
not explicitly, positively lead from Adorno’s thought to an approach 
of “enlightened elites” as a lesser evil. However, his thought does 
not preclude such a proposition. In fact, if one were to look for any 
implicit political stance in Adorno, the most likely one would be the 
insistence on constant reflection in order to bring together concepts 
and experience.  
In a similar vein, what are the characteristics of this authority, 
beyond ego-awareness? How do we articulate the conditions for its 
emergence? This proposition does not forward the same type of 
elites as Leo Strauss. Strauss cultivates elites as “genuine elites… a 
selected group of wise men who are devoted to the collective good, 
and who are freed from ambition and self-interest because of their 
pursuit of truth” (Halbertal 2007:163). That is, Strauss endorsed a 
class of political elites who were radical, secretive and duplicitous, 
and exempt from moral principles it deems applicable to the rest of 
3 What I mean by ego-firmness here is maturity in a Kantian sense, where an 
individual is capable of mustering the will to autonomously think, against the foil 
of what Adorno refers to as ego-weakness or immaturity, the inability to think 
against conventional cultural norms in any setting (Adorno and Becker 1983). 
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humanity (Drury 1988:xix; see also Strauss 1968), and whose 
“natural right” as “the stronger [was] to prevail" (see Strauss 1952). 
This form of elitism is, as critics have noted, doomed to fail, for 
“humans, even those who devote themselves to truth, are always 
embedded within the boundaries of the human condition,” (Halbertal 
2007:163) in particular elites who are relieved by Strauss of political 
responsibility, reflection, and moral principles.  
The question of authority and elites instead draws lineages 
between Theodor Adorno and Hannah Arendt to shed new light on 
the characteristics of such elites who would lead and dismantle 
heteronomy. In a scenario with fewer ego-firm than the many ego-
weak, power, defined in Arendtian terms as an emergent property of 
“togetherness” or collective action and speech (1958:178), would be 
unequally distributed and clustered around the ego-firm – in other 
words, togetherness or collective activity would be organized around 
the leadership of these individuals. For Arendt, the fate of the term 
“elite” draws from a radically different place than Strauss, who are 
not social, cultural, or professional elites, self-chosen “from those 
who care about public freedom and happiness… in stark contrast to 
so-called elite theories of democracy” (Hansen 1993:190). Arendt’s 
elites are not self-selected among political elites, but self-excluded, 
to the effect of reinforcing a freedom from politics and the ability to 
govern oneself as a genuinely human experience. After all, just as 
freedom in a public realm “provides for those qualities which can 
only be expressed among others who share a world in common, 
freedom from politics allows for the flourishing of intimacy, and the 
qualities of love and compassion” (ibid) – the anticipation of elites 
who are not only capable of wielding power, but capable of continual 
reflection, summoned by a genuine concern for people that is lost to 
a Straussian view of power as an irreconcilable right of the strong. 
As such, authority – anchored in power as the capacity to be obeyed 
unreflectively – is easily manifested and wielded – by those who 
wield influence reflectively – to enact the conditions that presuppose 
a new consciousness of maturity, bringing a novel mode of 
participation to irrupt into the status quo from within itself.  
Bernie Sanders illustrates a recent example of this form of ego-
firm elite and demonstrates the potential of creating such an elite to 
lead the masses. Disillusioned with the exploitative tendencies of 
modern governance, he headed a campaign entirely supported by 
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popular support in an effort to effect structural change. Despite his 
failure, he successfully mounted a powerful challenge against those 
who would keep the status quo, whilst pulling many people from 
political apathy and disengagement to active participation in politics, 
such as youth voters (Kawashima-Ginsberg et al 2016). Thus, the 
scale on which this would operate is not the evisceration of 
capitalism in its petrified conditions; it should only aim to inform 
and improve political participation and awaken political freedom 
from the illusion that it currently inhabits.  
After all, I do not, by this proposition, suggest there is an outside 
to heteronomy in the current social structure we should begin 
searching for – on the contrary, I recognize, and it is because there 
is no outside that we must begin looking within it. This proposition 
also does not intend to invoke Leninist sentiments concerned with 
the dismantling of the state. Such arguments are aplenty in 
contemporary populist movements launching broad indictments 
against a nebulous “establishment”, but whose protests are sadly 
fated to the “impatient praxis” seeking to change an uninterpreted 
world and, as a result, to the disappointed conduct of prefigurative 
politics that never move beyond utopianism and action for action’s 
sake – to weakness and failure (Adorno 1998:265).  
A New Mode of Resistance 
The ways in which political resistance and dissension are 
enacted, it follows, desperately need a transformation in form and 
vision. In the wake of mass political unrest around the globe over 
issues of exploitation and inequality, the need for effectual praxis 
becomes paramount. But critique alone is insufficient without 
suggestions for solutions – so what makes for effectual praxis?  
Marx’s eleventh thesis has become one of the most widely cited 
rallying cries for contemporary protests: “the philosophers have 
hitherto only interpreted the world, but the point is to change it” 
(Marx 1888). Yet the failures of major social movements and the 
wasted populism of countless supporters urge caution about its 
implications for action: action must not rule out interpretation. The 
perilous consequences of action alone have been made clear across 
time in impatient and ineffectual praxis, such as the 1968 French 
revolts and “their ‘barricades’ against ‘those who administer the 
bomb’ [which] illustrate contemporary activism’s misled, 
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inconsequential, even ‘ridiculous’ operations” (Adorno 1998:269 
cited by Benzer 2011:146) – and the incarnation of similar practices 
in modern activism, such as the assorted costumes and disconnected 
signs that pervaded the 2015 Global Climate March. Indeed, 
effective praxis or action must be preceded by interpretation, and 
succeeded by practical objectives.  
Prefiguration and its aforementioned qualities are the failed 
form of political collective action, at once the result of lack of 
interpretation, and the taking the place of practicality as a strategic 
outlook for protesters (Au 2017b,c). That is, maybe “we tried to 
change the world too quickly. The time is to interpret it again, to 
start thinking” (Zizek 2012). Only by interpreting the conditions 
surrounding a political process or phenomenon can strategies be 
designed and enacted to the greatest effect. In a similar vein, 
interpretation lends insight to the development of practical goals 
indispensable to effective political action.  
It is the widely held belief among protests that the further 
resistance objectives are pushed into deeper abstractions, the more 
support they are likely to attract (Au 2016; 2017a,d). The 2015 
Global Climate March attracted tens of thousands of protesters 
across both London and Paris under the broad, collective challenge 
of “saving the earth.” The virtually limitless boundaries of its criteria 
for membership were essential for attracting the support that it did, 
but also in the forms that it did – unbound and unrelated opinions. 
Whilst these tendencies are often justified by the social function of 
“raising awareness,” their efforts nevertheless failed to move beyond 
defeat and prefiguration. Nothing emerged as a direct result of the 
March. Thus, though attracting support through abstract goals is an 
alluring tactic, its prediction of effective action is tenuous at best.  
Further comparisons beyond Western societies corroborate the 
same admonitions about a broader, unfocused support-base versus a 
more restricted, focused one. In the fall of 2014, for instance, had 
Occupy Central activists in Hong Kong refined their political goals 
around hard, immediate policy changes, in lieu of the general calls 
for universal suffrage that they advanced, they may have succeeded 
in setting the grounds for more representative elections, as with their 
Taiwanese counterparts in Occupy Parliament just a few months 
prior in the spring of 2014, who insisted on the termination of a trade 
agreement – and succeeded. Despite the convergences in the two 
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movements around their resistance against an encroaching Chinese 
influence in local governance and their shared vision of 
independence from China, the Hong Kong protesters conflated this 
vision with their goals (Lam 2015), whilst the Taiwanese protesters 
distinguished the two and instead focused on resisting a specific 
policy proposal (Ho 2015). The distinction between the two forms 
of support lies in the degree to which they generate a cohesive sense 
of collective identity among their members, necessary for continued 
concerted action that ultimately motivates policy changes past the 
termination of individual protests. This is not inconsistent with 
Adorno’s indictments of ineffectual praxis (concerted political 
action). One should not behave, Adorno warns, as if one was capable 
of changing the world (Adorno et al 1976:129) or structure one’s 
efforts around pseudo-reality (Adorno 1998:291), for it, in turn, 
produces pseudo-activity that only feigns control over reality – 
failing to interpret it – and serves to replicate the status quo.  
On this score, I do not identify as pseudo-activity or ineffectual 
praxis all protest activity, but only that which has abandoned 
practical, achievable goals that do not venture into the abstract (i.e. 
dismantling capitalism) nor the disconcerted (i.e. a plethora of 
different goals). Nuanced, specific, and attainable goals that trade 
abstractions for practicality best prevent strategic vision from 
breaching pseudo-reality by remaining better focused on reality as is 
presently lived. Praxis, it stands, answers Adorno’s calls for social 
transformation when preceded by interpretation, extending the 
continuous project of critical social analysis (Adorno 1996:243) and 
connecting it with action, and succeeded by practical objectives, 
circumventing pseudo-reality and prefiguration.  
Discussion: The Negative Position Revisited 
Did Adorno endorse democracy? The answer, though an elusive 
yes, warrants a perusal through his work to identify the standards 
that he envisioned for democracy, piecing together the ideal 
standards from references scattered throughout his writings and 
interviews. Yet, efforts to do so must remain consistent with his 
fundamentally negative position, detecting what his vision of 
democracy was only through what it could not be. The result is the 
temporary empowerment and reliance on a variation of 
heteronomous authority itself: elites who could overturn the 
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regression of consciousness buried in the exchange principle and its 
manifestations.  
This proposition anticipates criticism on several accounts, which 
I will attempt to address here. First, it invites a charge of elitism. 
Adorno, however, was not elitist in the same terms that his critics 
describe. In his conversation with Becker, he repeatedly rejects 
talent and its iterative categories. Asserting that the “fetishization of 
talent… should be abolished”, he was committed to disproving the 
veracity of its base assumption as the romantic product of genetics, 
when in fact, it is “in large part a function of social conditions” 
(Adorno and Becker 1983). And where he admits the ego strength 
of the bourgeois individual (ibid), the theoretical preoccupation of 
his socio-critical project remains critical of society from a position 
on ego strength that extends beyond the limitations of individuals 
(Benzer 2011:126), much like how Marx’s “hatred… [was] much 
more against ideologues than… against the members of the ruling 
class” (Adorno 2008:116). Moreover, his critique of high art, which 
“deny the commodity society by the very fact that they obey their 
own law” (Adorno and Horkheimer [1944] 1997:157) lays bare his 
rejection of anything treated as independent of the relations of 
production.4 
Second is the obvious confrontation it prescribes with Adorno’s 
hatred for heteronomous authority itself. But would Adorno’s hatred 
for heteronomous authority outweigh his distrust of the masses in a 
way that allows for an alternative solution? Since, as detailed 
throughout this paper, Adorno would answer in the negative, to 
reject a proposition involving the use of heteronomous authority, 
4 This is because, Adorno’s critique of Benjamin’s thesis about film illustrates, 
nothing can truly claim to be independent of relations of production. Benjamin 
acknowledges film as an art form for “focusing on hidden details of familiar 
objects” and “exploring common place milieus under the ingenious guidance of 
the camera” to “extend our comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives 
and assure us of an immense and unexpected field of action” (1968:236-7). 
Adorno, by contrast, regarded this endorsement of film as uncritical, remarking to 
Benjamin that both high art and industrially produced consumer art “bear the 
stigmata of capitalism, both contain the elements of change… Both are torn halves 
of an integral freedom, to which, however, they do not add up” (Adorno quoted in 
Bernstein 2001:2, also Demiryol 2012). More centrally, the redemptive power of 
film does not overcome the restrictions inflicted by its dependence on an 
institution of cultural production defined by the logics of profit and exchange in 
capitalist society (Adorno and Becker 1983). 
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despite the potential it holds for its very dissolution, serves to 
prioritize the means above the ends, returning to ineffectual praxis. 
Commitment to effectual praxis informed by socio-critical 
awareness would, then, tolerate a temporary adherence to 
heteronomous authority in prioritizing the ends above the means. 
Third, the proposition of relying upon elites is not deductively 
concluded from Adorno’s stance. Fourth, and related, the closest 
approximation of a reflection among political agents – the elites, in 
my proposition – may also be an activist slogan associated with 
the Zapatistas (“Asking, we walk”). I accept the critique 
that my assessment is just as compatible with elites as with 
anarchist movements or other anarchist possibilities, but do so 
at the same time as I stress the acknowledgement that Adorno’s 
thought leaves open all these possibilities.  
Adorno’s procedure is typically first to criticize A and then non-
A – hence the preferred form for his criticism is the chiasmus, as 
Susan Buck-Morss, among others, has pointed out (see Buck-Morss 
1979). In other words, it cannot be concluded from his criticism of 
A that he implicitly affirms non-A, and so I do not positively deduce 
the assumption that he is affirming or explicitly endorsing an ego-
firm elite in the path to social transformation in democracy. Rather, 
I aim to simply tease it out as a possibility – one that he has not 
rejected and leaves open, which can be made congruent with the 
pursuit of social transformation. 
Although the roads to social transformation appear narrow in the 
escapable heteronomy of the present social structure, we can identify 
within Adorno’s standards a new program for effectual praxis in 
political resistance consisting of action, interpretation, and 
practicality as inextricable components that do not violate his 
admonishments against ineffectual praxis – and anticipate the 
precursors for the prospects of its arrival from within.  
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